Quarterly Reporting: The Next Target in the SEC’s Stewardship Retreat
07 April 2026
Quarterly Reporting: The Next Target of the SEC’s Stewardship Retreat
The US Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) is preparing to propose a shift away from mandatory quarterly reporting, with chair Paul Atkins expected to unveil the plan in the coming weeks. It would be the most consequential change to US disclosure cadence in decades.
The timing matters. The proposal arrives amid a broader recalibration of US market regulation, one that is steadily reducing formal points of investor leverage across disclosure, stewardship and shareholder rights. Read in that context, the quarterly reporting rethink is not a stand‑alone reform but part of a wider redefinition of how accountability to investors is structured.
A Familiar Proposal
Calls to relax quarterly reporting are not new. Executives and business groups have long argued that frequent reporting entrenches short-termism, distracts management and increases compliance costs. Donald Trump has repeatedly endorsed that view, and Atkins has made disclosure reform central to his effort to revive US IPO activity.
What is different this time is the regulatory backdrop. Over the past year the SEC has stepped back from substantive review of shareholder proposal disputes, thereby rewiring key mechanics of the proxy season. More recently, the Department of Labor has signalled a narrower conception of fiduciary and disclosure obligations. Against that backdrop, a reduction in mandatory reporting frequency carries more weight than a simple compliance adjustment.
Investors have been quick to make that point. Large asset managers and market participants including BlackRock, T. Rowe Price, Fidelity and Citadel have warned that less frequent reporting could weaken price discovery, increase volatility and raise the cost of capital. These are market function concerns, not niche stewardship objections.
Reporting Cadence as Governance Infrastructure
Quarterly reporting is often framed as a burden. For investors, it functions as infrastructure.
Regular, standardised reporting underpins engagement, stewardship and escalation. It creates a predictable cadence for dialogue between boards, management and shareholders, and anchors expectations around responsiveness and performance. Reducing that cadence would not simply lower disclosure volume. It would reshape when and how accountability occurs.
Dismantling Good Governance
Attacks on accountability matter more in a market where other formal investor touchpoints are already becoming less reliable. Since November, companies have been able to unilaterally decide they will take no action on shareholder proposals, excluding them from proxy materials without waiting for substantive SEC staff review. Minerva’s tracking of the 2026 proxy season shows that this shift has changed investor behaviour, with more time now spent assessing whether a proposal will appear on the ballot at all, rather than debating its merits.
The potential relaxation of quarterly reporting also sits alongside a parallel change in fiduciary framing. The Department of Labor’s proposed rule on Fiduciary Duties in Selecting Designated Investment Alternatives creates a process‑based safe harbour for certain investment selection decisions, while remaining largely silent on stewardship obligations and systemic risk considerations.
In this environment of weakening fiduciary duties, quarterly reporting provides one of the few hard anchors linking financial disclosure to governance and stewardship practice. Weakening that anchor would further loosen the connection between financial reporting and investor oversight.
Adaptation is not Acceptance
Early evidence from the 2026 proxy season suggests investors are adapting to some of the changes already in effect. Karen Kerschke, director of stewardship and sustainable investment at the Illinois state treasurer’s office, which oversees $65bn in assets, has said the impact of the no‑action changes has been “not as big as we feared”, noting continued openness from companies to meet and engage even where proposals are excluded.
That resilience should not be mistaken for comfort. Minerva’s analysis indicates that the burden on investors has increased, particularly for smaller asset owners with limited governance resources. Analysing unilateral exclusion decisions without regulatory guidance requires time, legal interpretation and process discipline that not all investors can absorb equally. Engagement is becoming more dependent on company discretion.
Seen through that lens, the prospect of less frequent financial reporting looks less like a neutral option and more like yet another incremental shift in the balance of power.
Optionality and its Consequences
It is not known exactly what shape the proposal on relaxation of quarterly reporting will take, but the SEC has emphasised its proposal would offer companies a choice, letting the market decide its optimal reporting frequency. It is possible that companies that value transparency could continue reporting quarterly.
In practice, optionality shifts norms. Companies under pressure gain a legitimate route to reduce disclosure, while investors lose a uniform standard they can rely on and comparability erodes.
What to Watch
Once released, the proposal will trigger an intense lobbying battle. Corporate executives and Republican lawmakers are likely to frame it as a competitiveness issue. Investors will frame it as a transparency and accountability issue.
The more important question is whether this proves to be a one‑off concession or part of a sustained redefinition of the SEC’s role. Taken alongside the retreat from no‑action review and the narrowing of protected fiduciary process, the direction of travel is becoming harder to ignore.
Last Updated: 7 April 2026