Health & Safety
BP failures ran deep in organisation, CSB concludes
Organisational and safety deficiencies stretching
through all levels of BP led to the 2005
explosion at the oil giant’s Texas City refinery that killed 15 people, a two
year investigation by the US Chemical
Safety and Hazard Investigation Board (CSB) has concluded.
In particular, the CSB noted that since 2000 procedural
deviations were the norm in almost all start-ups of the unit that exploded. None
of these abnormal start-ups were investigated by BP, nor were operating
procedures updated. The report calls on BP to appoint a new director with
expertise in process safety, and to establish a new incidence reporting
programme and use new safety performance indicators.
This follows the
findings of the independent Baker panel, formed and funded by BP in response
to the explosion, which reported “material deficiencies” in safety at BP’s five
US refineries. Carolyn Merritt, CSB chair, said she hoped the two investigations
will establish a new standard of care for boards and chief executives around the
world.
The report does not give names, but its conclusions seem
an indictment of the very qualities for which Lord Browne, outgoing BP chief
executive, used to be praised, said Lombard in the
Financial Times (21 March): his strategic vision, which spotted the
opportunity to grab Amoco, owner of Texas City; his drive for higher production;
and his skill at squeezing savings out of the combined group. The report’s
conclusions, suggested Lombard, should reverberate for chief executives beyond
the energy sector.
Links
BP
US Chemical Safety and Hazard
Investigation Board
Report of the BP Independent Refineries Safety Review Panel (Baker Panel Report)
Financial Times
April, 2007 |
